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Abstract: The link between ex post discrete shocks and private investment have never been 
formally tested in a panel data context, while the evidence of a link between ex ante 
commodity price uncertainty and investment is weak. This paper constructs measures of 
discrete shocks and uncertainty using a new multi-country data set of aggregate commodity 
price indices, and tests the relationship between various manifestations of commodity price 
variability and private investment rates within the context of a canonical empirical investment 
model estimated on a sample of 44 developing countries. The analysis confirms theoretical 
predictions that positive ex post commodity price shocks have strong positive effects on 
private investment rates in low income developing countries, conditional upon the level of 
commodity prices. It is also shown that the prospect of uncertain future commodity prices and 
ex post negative shocks do not affect private investment rates.  
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1. Introduction 
The literature on the effects of commodity price variability on macroeconomic 
performance in developing countries has been concerned primarily with two aspects of 
variability, namely discrete ex post price shocks and uncertainty about future prices. There are 
strong reasons to suspect that both these manifestations of variability should have important 
implications for investment: The theory of temporary trade shocks shows that investment can 
be expected to respond strongly to discrete ex post commodity price shocks (Bevan, Collier 
and Gunning (1990a), Collier, Gunning and Associates (1999)). Similarly, recent theoretical  
developments support the view that investment decisions may be very sensitive to uncertainty 
about the future outcomes of key variables affecting investment decisions (Dixit and Pindyck 
(1994)). In light of the widely recognised fact that commodity prices are highly volatile, it is 
therefore surprising that very little empirical work has sought to quantify the link between 
manifestations of commodity price variability and investment decisions in developing 
countries, seen as particularly vulnerable to commodity price volatility. A rare empirical 
contribution in the uncertainty literature is Serven (1998), who is unable to find statistical 
evidence of a strong negative link from terms of trade uncertainty to investment. The effects 
of discrete ex post shocks on investment have never been estimated empirically, although 
Deaton and Miller (1995) used a VAR model to show that commodity price movements more 
generally are positively associated with investment in a sample of African countries. 
Recent empirical evidence on growth suggests that while commodity export 
dependency confers both ex post shocks and ex ante uncertainty upon producing countries, 
what reduces their growth is not the prospect of volatile prices world prices, but the actual 
realisation of negative discrete commodity price shocks (Dehn (forthcoming-a)). This finding 
raises the interesting question whether the absence of a growth response to positive shocks 
can be seen as an indication that the prominence given to investment in the theory of 
temporary trade shocks is somehow misplaced, or, what is perhaps more likely, that the 
effects of positive shocks on investment are somehow dissipated and fail to result in a lasting 
improvement in GDP? Collier and Gunning (1996) have argued forcefully that dissipation 
can arise due to a combination of the policy stance at the time of the shock and policy 
changes made in response to shocks, lack of access to adequate savings instruments on the 
part of windfall recipients, and inaccessibility on the part of private agents to information 
about the nature of the shock. A related question is whether changes in investment alone can 
account for the powerful negative growth effects which precipitate from discrete negative 
shocks, given that an alternative avenue of adjustment is changing capacity utilisation? 
Finally, is the absence of a growth response to changes in future commodity price uncertainty 
replicated for investment? 
This paper attempts to address these questions by examining the relationship between 
private investment rates on one hand and ex post commodity price shocks and ex ante 
commodity price uncertainty on the other. The framework of analysis is canonical flexible 
accelerator model of investment estimated on a dynamic panel of 44 developing countries. 
The investment model is constructed with reference to previous empirical investment models 
which have been estimated using data on developing countries.  
The key findings are the following: First, the theoretical prediction that positive 
commodity price shocks have strong positive and significant effects on private investment 
rates in developing countries is confirmed with the proviso that positive shocks are 
conditioned upon the level of commodity prices. Positive shocks generally boost investment,   2 
but only up to a point. If a shock occurs at a time when commodity prices are already high, 
the net effect on investment rates weakens.  
Secondly, uncertainty about future commodity prices does not affect investment 
decisions. Investors in developing countries are exposed to multiple sources of uncertainty 
ranging from political instability and economic policy changes to exogenous weather shocks, 
disease, and civil strife. In the presence of multiple sources of uncertainty, commodity price 
uncertainty per se is not critical to investors. Hence, the data shows that investors only pay 
attention to commodity price movements is when these take the form of extreme upwards 
price changes. 
Thirdly, levels and first differences of commodity prices as well as large negative 
shocks do not affect private investment rates. The very asymmetric investment response to 
positive and negative shocks is possibly due to irreversibility of investment which reduces the 
scope for disinvesting, especially in commodity sectors where replacement investment rates 
are small. The implication is that adjustment to negative shocks occurs via a reduction in 
capacity utilisation. 
The results are robust to changes in sample composition, different estimation 
methodologies, and different definitions of uncertainty.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical and empirical 
literature on shocks and investment, while Section 3 examines the corresponding literature 
which links uncertainty and investment. In section 4, a canonical empirical investment model 
is outlined. In section 5, the uncertainty and shock variables are introduced into the empirical 
framework. Section 6 discusses the empirical issues which arise in the context of dynamic 
panel data estimation. Section 7 presents the results, and Section 8 concludes. 
 
2. Shocks and investment  
The standard ‘Dutch Disease’ model has mainly focused on consumption and sectoral 
income distribution effects within a comparative static analytical framework suitable for 
evaluating long run effects ((Corden (1984), Neary (1985), Bruno (1982)). However, the 
premise of shock permanence, which underlies Dutch Disease models is unsuitable for 
developing countries for at least three reasons: First, the bulk of commodity shocks are 
arguably temporary rather than permanent (Deaton and Laroque (1992),  Bevan, Collier and 
Gunning (1990a)). Secondly, a dynamic modelling approach is more suitable for describing 
the effects of transitory shocks. Finally, as the analytical framework switches to a dynamic 
one, the variables of interest also change from consumption and income distribution towards 
investment.  
  Collier and Gunning (1999a) have recently provided a theoretical illustration of the 
investment response to a temporary trade shock within the context of a Ramsey model.
1  The 
model shows that with a closed capital account adjustment to a temporary shock involves two 
phases: In the first phase, the capital stock increases via investment. This phase is likely to be 
characterised by a construction boom if investment requires both tradable and non-tradable 
capital good inputs. Construction booms have been widely reported during shocks ((Collier 
and Gunning (1999a)). In the second phase, investment is reversed. The model assigns great 
importance to the policy stance adopted for the capital account according to the rationale that 
large windfalls drive down the rate of return to capital within the domestic economy as the 
                                                            
1 The original statement of mechanisms of a temporary trade shock is contained in Bevan, Collier and Gunning 
(1990a).   3 
most lucrative investment opportunities are gradually exploited.
2 In such circumstances, 
agents in the domestic economy stand to gain from having access to foreign savings 
instruments, which allows them to avoid the temporary erosion of investment returns. When 
agents have access to foreign savings instruments, the investment dynamic involves four 
phases: In the first phase, savings are invested domestically to exploit the high rate of return 
differential with the rest of the world which exists due to the borrowing constraint. In the 
second phase, as the rates of return on construction and other domestic investment 
opportunities approach the return available on international deposits, agents switch any 
additional windfall savings into foreign assets to ensure a better return to the windfall than is 
available domestically. In phase three, as the shock dwindles away foreign assets are first 
repatriated, and then in phase four domestic investment is finally reversed. The savings rate 
which determines the size of the investment response is determined the duration of the shock 
(Bevan, Collier and Gunning (1990b)).  
Investment in the Bevan-Collier-Gunning model is reversible, and the exact 
magnitude of the shock is known with certainty. Mash (1998) models discrete time 
investment dynamics in response to shocks of uncertain duration when investment decisions 
are irreversible. The model has a commodity export sector and an import competing sector, 
each with specific capital. Labour is fixed, but fully mobile across sectors. Once capital is 
installed it is irreversible. There is a delivery lag between the decision to invest and the time 
when new capital goods become productive. Finally, the model assumes access to a perfect 
capital market. Mash shows that in this framework aggregate investment responds both to the 
shock and to its reversal. The capital stock of the favoured sector initially expands rapidly 
after the favourable relative price change, while the other sector stops its replacement 
investment in order to let its (irreversible) capital stock depreciate. When prices are reversed 
at the end of the shock, the non-favoured sector then expands again, while the export sector 
contracts. In each period, the aggregate effect across the two sectors therefore depends on the 
relative size of the two sectors, the lags in delivery of capital goods, relative rates of 
depreciation, and the duration of the shock. In the presence of technical progress, relative 
capital stock obsolescence rates are also likely also to influence the aggregate effect. The 
main conclusion from Mash’s model is that in the absence of detailed information on 
expectations about the duration of the shock, gestation lags, depreciation and obsolescence 
rates, and sector capital stock sizes, it is impossible a priori to determine the magnitude of the 
aggregate investment response to shocks. 
Empirically, the effects of discrete shocks on private investment have yet to be 
evaluated, although the subject has been given considerable qualitative attention in Collier, 
Gunning and Associates (1999). Their argument, which is based on a series of individual 
country case studies, is that both the quantity and quality of investment is reduced during 
shocks due to a combination of factors, including limitations on private agents’ access to 
foreign savings, and excessive and wrongly directed public expenditures. In another study, 
Deaton and Miller (1995) find that commodity prices are positively correlated with 
investment in developing countries, although this paper does not test whether large and small 
price changes have different effects, nor whether positive and negative shocks have distinct 
effects. Finally, in another paper which also does not explicitly examine investment, Rodrik 
(1999) argues that windfalls are appropriated by powerful interest groups due to a lack of 
                                                            
2 In practice, the marginal efficiency of investment may also fall if investment bunching puts upwards pressure 
on the price of capital goods due to short run supply constraints.    4 
agencies of restraint. This allocation mechanism, Rodrik argues, ensures that windfalls are 
either not invested at all or invested in projects which are sub-optimal and possibly 
unsustainable.  
 
3. Uncertainty and investment 
The poor empirical performance of deterministic investment models has kindled a 
growing interest in the role played by uncertainty (Abel and Blanchard (1986)). Once 
uncertainty becomes a potential determinant of investment, attitudes to risk on the part of 
investors become important, because firm investment decisions can only be viewed in 
isolation of the consumption decisions of households when there is access to a perfect market 
for Arrow securities. In their absence, firm owners may be averse to taking risks at firm level 
for fear of the repercussions such decisions have for the household’s consumption. Risk 
aversion, however, has an unambiguous negative impact on investment, so it is arguably more 
interesting to assume risk neutrality on the part of investors in order to illustrate other avenues 
whereby uncertainty may affect investment.  
Thus, assuming risk neutrality Hartman (1972) and Abel (1983) show that investment 
is a positive function of uncertainty whenever profits are a convex function of the stochastic 
variable (by Jensen’s Inequality). In good states of the world, the firm (with a given capital 
stock) takes on additional labour, which raises the marginal product of capital more than 
linearly with price of output. Meanwhile, in bad states the firm can rid itself of excess labour. 
The profit function’s convexity thus ensures that the return to capital in a good state 
outweighs the loss of investing in the bad state, provided the firm is able to adjust variable 
cost. Convexity can also result from the ability of the monopolistic firm to vary output.
3  
The Hartman/Abel models suggest that the Marshallian conditions of determining 
when to invest should hold on average, but actual investment typically does not occur until 
price exceeds long run average cost by a factor of three or four (Pindyck and Solimano 
(1993)). Dixit and Pindyck (1994) shows that this hurdle rate feature follows directly from the 
three premises: First, there is ongoing uncertainty about future outcomes, and waiting for 
additional information can reduce this uncertainty. Secondly, firms can postpone investment 
without foregoing the investment opportunity, because there is not free entry to the industry; 
by implication there is imperfect competition. Thirdly, investment decisions are irreversible. 
Jointly, these assumptions imply an opportunity cost of immediate investment over and above 
the long run average cost, which is the value of waiting for additional information (Bernanke 
(1983)). For example, a firm which invests and then cannot reverse its investment in the event 
of a downturn in the following period is stuck with an excessive capital stock. On the other 
hand, a firm which waits until the next period can avoid this predicament. The firm which 
waits will, however, incur an opportunity cost in terms of forgone current profits by operating 
with a capital stock which is below optimum size. The value to waiting arises when this 
opportunity cost in current profit terms is low compared to the cost of carrying out the 
irreversible investment and then being stuck with excessive capital in the event of a 
downturn. This opportunity cost, it is argued, is low compared to the cost of excessive 
                                                            
3 Predictably, when the Hartman result is combined with risk aversion on the part of firm owners, the effect of 
uncertainty on investment becomes ambiguous (Zeira (1987)). This is because the convexity of the profit 
function raises investment in uncertainty, while the concavity of the utility function discourages investors.    5 
investment, wherefore the net value of waiting is large and positive (Caballero (1991); Abel 
and Eberly (1994)).
4 
While the combination of uncertainty and irreversibility can account for hurdle rates, 
it is not in itself sufficient to secure a negative link between investment and uncertainty, 
which requires additional assumptions about imperfect competition or decreasing returns, or 
both. These assumptions have the effect of making the marginal product of capital a 
decreasing function of the level of the capital stock in conditions of irreversibility, such that  
the rise in profitability under uncertainty due to the convexity of the profit function is 
outweighed by the rise in the profitability threshold, which itself rises with uncertainty, such 
that the overall effect is negative (Caballero (1991)).   
What are the implications of uncertainty for investment on average? Perhaps 
surprisingly, the effect is ambiguous. Irreversibility means that individual firm behaviour is 
characterised by periods of positive gross investment and zero gross investment, since firms 
only adjust their capital stocks in sufficiently good times.
5 In good times, firms invest less 
than they would in a fully reversible world in order not to be stuck with too much capital in 
the event of a downturn, but they only do so because they know they will be stuck with too 
much capital in the event of a bad outcome. On average, they therefore hold too little capital 
in good times and too much in bad times, and the precise outcome is essentially ambiguous.
6  
At aggregate level, firms face firm level (idiosyncratic) uncertainty and industry-wide 
(aggregate) uncertainty.
7 If Hartman’s convex profit function result is accepted, firm specific 
idiosyncratic shocks have a positive effect on investment, but aggregate uncertainty is likely 
to affect firms differently depending on whether the industry is perfectly or imperfectly 
competitive. Imperfectly competitive firms can exploit the option to wait, so the firm level 
results carry over to the industry. For perfectly competitive firms, however, the value of the 
option to wait is zero, because hesitant firms will see their perceived option usurped by new 
entrants due to free entry, or because other incumbents expand their output. The industry 
supply curve therefore immediately shifts to the right, dampening any demand driven price 
increase. Meanwhile, the response of competitive firms to a bad state is to lower prices by 
moving along the supply curve, which has a definite negative impact on price. The 
combination of free entry and limited exit due to irreversibility therefore also introduces a 
payoff asymmetry to good and bad states of the world in the competitive industry. Positive 
shocks do not raise profits, but negative shocks lowers them, so the average payoff is reduced 
by uncertainty. The implication that firms invest less in good states therefore carries over 
from firm to industry level albeit for different reasons (Caballero and Pindyck (1996)).  
Another feature which distinguishes aggregate investment from firm level investment 
is that the former tends to be far smoother than the action-inaction investment decisions of 
individual firms. Caballero (1993) and Bertola and Caballero (1994) explain this ‘excess 
smoothness’ in terms of the distribution of marginal profitability across firms. A consequence 
of irreversibility and firm specific shocks is that at any point in time some firms will be 
investing while others will not be investing. Whether or not a firm is investing depends on the 
                                                            
4 Interestingly, the introduction of an option to invest creates ambiguity about the effect of the cost of capital on 
investment; higher interest rates raise the cost of investment, but they also reduce the incentive to wait. 
5 This result also obtains simply as a result of irreversibility as shown by Arrow (1968). 
6 Bertola and Caballero (1990) show that actual outcome depends on very specific parametric assumptions.  
7 The two are identical for the monopolist, but in all other cases firm and aggregate uncertainty are distinct 
influences.   6 
firm’s underlying marginal profitability of capital, which is different across all firms due to 
the idiosyncratic shocks. The distribution of marginal profitability reflects the difference 
between optimal and actual capital stocks, and its peakedness is a function of depreciation 
rates and other factors affecting the speed of capital stock adjustment. ‘Excess smoothness’ 
arises because the cross-sectional distribution channels parts of the energy of aggregate 
shocks into greater or lesser capacity utilisation by individual firms rather than wholly into 
investment.    
A corollary of this property of aggregate investment is that when the industry faces 
positive aggregate shocks and more firms invest the cross sectional distribution narrows. A 
sequence of positive aggregate shocks therefore brings more firms near to full capacity 
utilisation, which means that aggregate shocks are more likely to be translated into aggregate 
investment effects. In contrast, a sequence of negative shocks causes firms to investment less 
and therefore widens the cross-sectional distribution. By implication, upside uncertainty is 
more likely to lead to aggregate investment shocks, while downside uncertainty is more likely 
to be smoothed out due to the buffering effect of a wider spread in the marginal profitability 
of capital across the firms in the industry. 
A number of uncertainty variables have been tested in the investment literature, but 
the specific effects of ex ante commodity price uncertainty have not received much attention.
8 
An important exception is the recent study by Serven (1998) who quantifies the contribution 
of ex ante terms of trade uncertainty on private investment. Using a large dynamic panel of 
developing countries, Serven finds that terms of trade uncertainty is not a statistically 
significant determinant of private investment. 
 
4. A simple canonical empirical model of investment 
There is no broad agreement about what is the ‘correct’ specification of the empirical 
aggregate private investment equation (Rama (1993)). The approach adopted in this paper is 
to construct a simple canonical investment equation with reference to the existing empirical 
literature on cross-country investment equations for developing countries, and then 
augmenting this model with variables which capture commodity shocks and uncertainty.   
The basic theoretical framework used for the canonical model is the flexible 
accelerator model by Bond et al. (1997). The desired capital stock (kit , ) is written as a log-
linear function of output ( yit , ) and the real user cost of capital ( jit , ): 
 
ka y j it it it ,, , =+ + σ           [ 1 ]  
 
The subscripts iN = 1,...,  and tT = 1,...,  refer to the cross-section and time series 
dimensions of the data, respectively. [1] is consistent with profit maximisation subject to 
constant returns to scale and a CES production function, and nests the possibility of a fixed 
capital output ratio (σ = 0). Temporarily ignoring the costs terms, differencing [1] produces 
the expression  
 
∆∆ ky it it ,, =            [ 2 ]  
                                                            
8 For example, Pindyck and Solimano (1993) find a moderately negative relationship between investment and 
inflation,  inflation variability, exchange rate variability, and interest rate variability.   7 
 
where  ∆  is the difference operator. Unfortunately, data on the size of capital stocks are not 
widely available for developing countries. To resolve this problem, note first that ∆kit , can be 



















 can be replaced by investment rates as is commonly done. The transformation 
of the dependent variable from investment to capital stock to investment to GDP means that 
right hand side coefficients will be roughly three times the magnitude of the coefficients 
which obtain from using capital stock ratios.
9 With these modifications, we arrive at a simple 
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In addition to time specific and country specific effects in the error term, a dynamic 
adjustment term has been included in [4] in recognition of the tendency towards excess 
smoothness in aggregate investment series in the face of aggregate shocks (Caballero (1993)). 
The long run relationship between investment and income can be recovered as 
[] [] () ββ ρ 01 1 +− / , which we expect to be unity if constant returns to scale are in evidence.  
The aggregate demand terms are proxied by the growth rate of GDP and its lag. Many 
other studies have found that these enter the investment equation with strong positive 
coefficients (Vogel and Buser (1976); Fry (1980); Tun Wai and Wong (1982); Gupta (1984); 
Garcia (1987); Leff and Sato (1988); Love (1989); Greene and Villanueva (1991)). The 
possible endogeneity problems which arise from using aggregate demand as a regressor are 
discussed in Section 6.   
The vector Xit ,  in [4] captures auxiliary variables thought to influence investment in 
developing countries. Principal among these are the cost of capital. Jorgensen (1963) provides 
strong theoretical reasons to consider the cost of capital as a determinant of investment, and a 
number of studies, which have included the relative price of capital have found its coefficient 
to be significant and negative (Galbis (1979); Fry (1980); Gupta (1984); Leff and Sato 
(1988); Greene and Villanueva (1991)). The literature is, however, divided on which precise 
measure of the cost of capital is appropriate. Some studies use interest rates as an indicator of 
the cost of borrowing (or the opportunity cost of foregone alternative uses of the investable 
funds). Other studies use measures of the price of capital goods. Conceptually, however, 
interest rates and the price of capital goods are not the same thing, and there is no guarantee 
that they will move together. It was therefore decided to follow the approach of Serven 
(1998), who uses regressors which capture both the opportunity cost of investing (we use a 
                                                            
9 Assuming a capital output ratio of 3.   8 
measure of real domestic interest rates) and the price of capital goods in the canonical 
equation. 
The role public investment - infrastructure provision - in private investment decision 
making has been examined in a number of investment equations for developing countries, 
including Galbis (1979), Blejer and Khan (1984), Gupta (1984), Greene and Villanueva 
(1991), and Oshikoya (1994). To the extent that public investment is financed by domestic 
borrowing, the amount of savings available for the private sector is correspondingly reduced 
when the government invests, thus crowding out private investment. This effect is potentially 
mitigated, however, by the extent of capital mobility.
10 In the extreme case of perfect capital 
mobility, for example, international capital will flow in as domestic interest rates rise, which 
causes interest rates to fall again leaving total investment unchanged, but its composition 
changed. On the other hand, public investment may also facilitate private investment if public 
and private investments are complementary. Generally, studies have found conflicting roles of 
public investment on private investment decision. Blejer and Khan (1984) and Gupta (1984) 
found a strong negative relationship between public investment and private investment using 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Two Stage Least Squares (TSLS) estimation methods, 
respectively. On the other hand, the Galbis and Greene & Villanueva studies suggest that 
public investment crowds in private investment, for example, by lowering private transaction 
costs via infrastructure provisions. Oshikoya (1994) finds some evidence that public 
infrastructure investment positively affects private investment, while non-infrastructure 
investment has a negative impact on private investment. Hence, while there is some 
disagreement over the direction of the effects, there is broad recognition that public 
investment is potentially important to private investors, wherefore this variable rightly 
belongs in a canonical private investment equation. We use the ratio of public investment to 
GDP as a regressor.  
In addition to the role of aggregate demand, relative prices, and public investment, 
which apply to rich and poor countries alike, conventional investment equations for 
developing countries typically include variables thought to be of particular importance in this 
subset of countries. Chief among the additional regressors are policy variables. Policy is 
regarded as a particularly important determinant of investment in African countries, which are 
generally seen as more capital hostile than other regions (Collier, Hoeffler and Pattillo 
(1999)).    
A number of different policy variables have been used in investment equations, and it 
is not clear a priori which variables to use. It is of some comfort, therefore, that policy 
variables tend to be highly correlated with each other (Collier and Dollar (1999)). This means 
that attention can be confined to a few indicators thought to be especially relevant to 
investment. This paper considers the share of credit to the private sector and capital account 
restrictions as the policy variables of choice. Private sector credit, used in investment 
equations by Serven and Solimano (1993), is potentially an important determinant of 
investment rates, because low real interest rates induce savers to not deposit their savings in 
banks, which are therefore unable to mediate funds towards potentially profitable investment 
projects. Financial repression also takes the form of non-price rationing, whereby scarce 
savings are pre-allocated to selected investors, usually the government. King and Levine 
(1993) show that investment and the share of credit allocated to the private sector are 
                                                            
10 The extent to which crowding out occurs in response to budget deficits depends among on things on whether 
there is Ricardian Equivalence.   9 
positively correlated, and Serven (1998) finds that private credit shares are a strong 
determinant of private investment in 60 developing countries. Credit availability was also 
shown to be a significant determinant of private investment by Vogel and Buser (1976), Fry 
(1980), Tun Wai and Wong (1982), Blejer and Khan (1984), Gupta (1984), Garcia (1987),  
Leff and Sato (1988)), and Oshikoya (1994).   
We have already argued that capital account restrictions are an important determinant 
of investment in the context of shocks. But capital account restrictions also have a more 
general role. In economies with closed capital accounts, investment only takes place up to the 
point where domestic savings equal domestic investment at a given rate of interest. If this 
equilibrium interest rate is above world interest rates, as one would expect for developing 
countries where capital is relatively scarce, opening capital markets would ceteris paribus 
cause capital to flow in enabling a larger amount of investment than can be financed by 
domestic savings alone. As an indicator of the openness of the capital account, we use the 
capital account openness measure developed by Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995). This 
variable, which is based on IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions, takes the value of 1 when a restriction on “payments for capital transactions” is 
in place, and 0 otherwise. A drawback of the variable is that it does not measure their 
intensity.  
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where  DomR are real domestic interest rates, RPK is the real price of capital goods, Pub is 
the ratio of public investment to GDP, Cred  is the share of credit to the private sector, and 
KAR is the dummy variable denoting capital account restrictions.  
 
 
5. Introducing uncertainty and shocks into the investment equation 
The canonical specification outlined in the previous section is now augmented with 
two additional sets of variables: The first, VARit ,  is a country specific measure of ex ante 
commodity price uncertainty. We consider a total of nine different versions of this variable, 
including three time varying definitions. The second set is a vector of dummies and variables, 
Sit , , which comprises the log of commodity price in levels, positive and negative shock 
dummies, and interaction terms between shocks and the log of commodity prices, 
respectively. Sit , is intended primarily as a means of capturing ex post shock effects.  
Both uncertainty and discrete shock variables are constructed from a geometrically 
weighted index of commodities similar in structure to one used by Deaton and Miller (1995). 
The formula describing the index is 




i =∏           [ 7 ]  
 
where  W i is a weighting item and  P i  is the dollar international commodity price for the 
commodity  i . Dollar prices measure cif border prices. Historical fob prices, which give a 
preferable measure of the value of a commodity to the exporting country are not generally 
available. The weighting item, W i, is the value of commodity i  in the total value of all 











.           [ 8 ]  
 
Since W i is country specific, each country’s aggregate commodity price index is unique. As 
an average of the prices of the commodities exported by each country, the index is primarily 
suited to the study of macroeconomic rather than sectoral effects.  
A geometrical weighting scheme is useful for two reasons. After taking logs a 
geometric index provides the rate of change of prices in first differences, which is a useful 
property. Also, geometrically weighted indices avoid the numeraire problem which affects 
deflated arithmetically weighted indices. Further details on the construction of the index can 
be found in Dehn (forthcoming-a). 
Ex post shocks are identified by applying a purely statistical definition to each 
country’s commodity price index. The steps are the following: First, each country’s aggregate 
commodity price series is made stationary by first differencing the series, which removes the 
any permanent innovations.
11 Secondly, the remaining ‘predictable’ elements are removed by 
regressing the differenced series on its own lag, and a second lag in levels as well as a linear 
time trend. This error correction specification [9] is an efficient way to model an integrated 
process, because it removes both the ‘predictable’ levels and differences information which 
informs the data. 
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The residuals from [9], εit, are then normalised by subtracting their mean and dividing by 
their standard deviation, and finally an extreme but essentially arbitrary cut off point is 
applied to the stationary normalised residuals. The base case cut off point used here puts 2.5% 
of the observations into each tail region, although alternative 5% and 10% cut off points are 
also used. Shocks can of course occur at any price level, and since it may matter to the quality 
and quantity of investment whether a shock occurs at a high or a low level of commodity 
                                                            
11 It is assumed that the commodity price series are I(1) rather than trend stationary. In practice, determining with 
a high degree of confidence whether a series is a stochastic trend process or a deterministic trend process is 
difficult. See Leon and Soto (1995).    11 
prices, we also allow for the shock dummies to condition on the (log of the) level of 
commodity prices.  
  Ex ante uncertainty can be measured in many different ways, and there is no 
consensus on what constitutes the ‘correct’ method of measurement. This suggests that there 
is merit in considering three broad alternative approaches to measuring uncertainty. The naïve 
approach involves treating all price movements as indicative of uncertainty by calculating the 
standard deviation each country’s aggregate commodity price index. This is unsatisfactory on 
a number of counts. Most importantly, it does not control for the predictable components and 
trends in the price evolution process, and is therefore likely to overstate uncertainty. Both 
Serven (1998) and Ramey and Ramey (1995) have argued that this distinction is important. 
  The second approach therefore explicitly distinguishes between predictable and 
unpredictable components of the price series, but remains time invariant. The measure is 
based on the principle proposed by Ramey and Ramey (1995) that the ‘predictable’ 
components of the price series can be modelled using a selection of explanatory variables. 
The variance of the residuals can then be thought of as uncertainty. However, in contrast to 
Ramey and Ramey (1995), we do not regress commodity prices on a series of explanatory 
variables, but adopt instead a time series approach, whereby the first difference of real 
commodity prices (in logs) is regressed on as many of what can be regarded as predictable as 
possible. In particular, the regressors include autoregressive terms (first lag), a second lag in 
levels (making the regression akin to an error correction specification), plus deterministic 
trend terms, and dummies to pick up deterministic quarterly effects:   
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The three quarterly dummies, Dt, take the value of 1 for the second, third, and fourth 
quarters, respectively, zero otherwise. The constant captures the base period intercept. This 
approach treats as predictable the trend parameters, the parameters on the quarterly dummies, 
and on the lagged differences and levels of the dependent variable according to the argument 
that past values and trends can be thought of as being accumulated as knowledge by agents, 
wherefore uncertainty estimates must purge these known priors. 
Cashin, Liang and McDermott (1999) argue that uncertainty worsened during the 
1970s. If this is so, it is clearly not appropriate to maintain the assumption of 
homoskedasticity implicit in the two uncertainty measures considered hitherto. The third 
approach therefore distinguishes not only between predictable and unpredictable components 
of prices, but also allows the variance of the unpredictable components to vary with time. 
Time varying, or conditional, variances can be estimated by applying a Generalised 
Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model to each country’s aggregate 
commodity price index (Bollerslev (1986)). A univariate GARCH(1,1) specification similar 
to that adopted by Serven (1998) is applied uniformly across countries: 
   12 
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 denotes the variance of εt  conditional upon information up to period.  The fitted 
values of σit ,
2  are the measure of uncertainty of  yit . Quarterly dummies, Dj , were included 
to remove possible deterministic seasonal influences on the conditional variance. Each 
quarterly dummy takes a value of 1 for a particular quarter, zero otherwise, and the final 
quarter is catered for by the constant term.  
Failure to account for major structural breaks in the mean equation of [11] may result 
in distorted uncertainty variables as the break is relegated to the residual, which in turn 
informs the uncertainty measure. Likewise, large outliers in the mean equation may dominate 
both time invariant and time varying uncertainty measures. It is entirely conceivable, 
however, that agents view outliers as sufficiently infrequent and atypical to disregard their 
effect when evaluating future price uncertainty. Breaks may likewise be discounted. Versions 
of both the Ramey and Ramey and GARCH uncertainty measures were therefore constructed 
to take account of such possibilities. A version of the Ramey and Ramey measure therefore 
allows for a trend and intercept break in the commodity price series in 1973 on the hypothesis 
that the rise in commodity prices at this time was seen as permanent. Similarly, versions of 
the GARCH uncertainty measures were constructed which respectively ‘dummy out’ all the 
shocks identified above, and ‘dummy out’ only the first oil shock (again on the hypothesis 
that this was a permanent shock rather than the start of a period of greater uncertainty). 
Finally, conditional standard deviation measures of uncertainty (as opposed to conditional 
variances) were derived by taking the square root of the three GARCH conditional variance 
uncertainty measures on the grounds that it cannot be determined  a priori whether agents 
observe the standard deviation or variance. The total number of uncertainty measures is 
therefore 9 (summarised in Table 1).  Further descriptions of the distribution of shocks across 
time and their magnitude as well as the patterns of commodity price uncertainty have been 
described elsewhere (see Dehn (forthcoming-a) and Dehn (forthcoming-b)). 
 
 6. Issues of estimation 
Estimation of dynamic panel equations such as [6] raise a number of issues. Consider 
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where  Xit ,  is a row vector containing both policy variables and standard investment 
regressors. η i are time invariant country specific effects. λt is a country-invariant term which 
accounts for any time specific effects not included in the regression. Finally, εit ,  is a random 
noise error term.    13 
The objective is to recover consistent estimates of the coefficient on the lagged 
dependent variable as well as the coefficients on the other regressors. A range of dynamic 
panel data estimators are available, and each estimator has very different qualities (Judson 
and Owen (1996)).  Hsiao (1986) shows that pooled OLS estimation of [7] results in omitted 
variable bias arising from correlation between the country specific effects, ηi, and the lagged 
dependent variable,  yit , −1. The dependent variable is, of course, a function of ηi, but the time 
invariance of ηi means that the lagged dependent variable is also a function of ηi. The 
resulting positive correlation between the lagged dependent variable and a component of the 
error term causes the estimate on the lagged dependent variable to be upwardly biased. This 
problem can be avoided by using a Fixed Effects Within Groups (FE(WG)) estimator. The 
FE(WG) estimator transforms the data by subtracting the time series mean of each variable, 
thereby sweeping out the country specific effects. The transformation does not, however, 
remove any (negative) correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the time 
varying component of the error term as shown by Nickell (1981). This residual ‘Nickell Bias’ 
means that the FE(WG) estimator yields a downwards biased and inconsistent estimate of the 
coefficients on the lagged dependent variable in [12]. Only when the time series dimension 
approaches infinity does the Nickell bias approach zero, but this is never the case in 
developing country macroeconomics data wherefore the Nickell bias must be taken seriously. 
By virtue of the fact that the biases go in opposite directions, the OLS and FE(WG) estimates 
define the upper and lower limits of the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable in 
otherwise well-specified equations, and we would expect an unbiased estimate of the 
coefficient ρ  in [6] to lie within the interval ρ ρ ρ OLS unbiased FE WG ≥≥ ()  (Hoeffler (1998)). 
If the right hand side variables in [6] are endogenous to investment, both OLS and 
FE(WG) estimators will yield biased and inconsistent estimates. As alluded to earlier, this 
might be the case if, for example, aggregate demand is endogenous to investment via the 
multiplier. There are several ways to address the problem. One is to estimate a system of 
simultaneous equations, but this usually introduces problems of identification, which can only 
be solved by introducing further variables which themselves may be endogenous, and so on. 
Another method is to instrument for the endogenous variables. Instruments may be external or 
internal. External instruments are often difficult to find given the general scarcity of data. 
Moreover, there is no guarantee that external instruments are particularly efficient. It has 
therefore become common practise use internal instruments to avoid the Nickell bias 
problem. The Anderson and Hsiao (1982) estimator thus utilises the second lag of the 
endogenous variable as an instrument. As long as the error term is not serially correlated, this 
instrument is valid. If serial correlation is present, however, higher order lags may be 
necessary. While Arrelano (1989) has shown that levels instruments are more efficient than 
differences in the Anderson-Hsiao estimator, the use of instruments in the Anderson-Hsiao 
estimator is generally not particularly efficient. An alternative approach is the Differenced 
GMM estimator (DIF-GMM) of Arrelano and Bond (1991), which allows for a wider range of 
internal instruments to be used. Each available instrument is weighted by the inverse of its 
variance, which means that a more efficient estimate of the endogenous variable is obtained. 
The validity of the choice of instruments in the DIF-GMM estimator is determined in 
part by the relationship between current and past errors and in part by the relationship 
between the errors and the dependent variable. In all cases, it is assumed that the errors are 
serially uncorrelated and independent across cross-section units. Provided that this condition   14 
is met, three classes of instruments can be identified depending on the relationship between 
the regressors and the errors, where the distinction is made between exogenous, endogenous, 
and predetermined variables. When the regressors are strictly exogenous to the error term 
such that  Ex it is () ,, ε = 0 for all st , , then all past, present, and future values of xit ,  are valid 
instruments for the differenced equations. When the regressors are predetermined with respect 
to the error term, which means that Ex it is () ,, ε = 0 for t ≥ 2 , then the second and higher order 
lags of xit ,  are valid instruments for the differenced variable. Finally, when xit ,  is 
endogenous, such that current shocks and xit ,  are correlated (Ex it is () ,, ε ≠ 0 for st ≤  and 
Ex it is () ,, ε = 0 for st > ), then only values of the endogenous variable lagged two periods or 
more are valid instruments.  
The Anderson-Hsiao and DIF-GMM estimators have distinct advantages over the 
OLS and FE(WG) estimators, but in the context of the present analysis they may not 
constitute preferred estimator for the following reasons: First, the required first differencing 
of the data throws away much of the information contained in the data.
12 The severe 
constraints on the availability of annual macroeconomics data for developing countries 
suggests that available data should be used as efficiently as possible. Secondly, when a series 
is close to a random walk then lagged levels instruments used in the DIF-GMM estimator are 
poor instruments, because the past values of a near white noise stationary growth variable 
have little forecasting power.   
In these circumstances, Blundell and Bond (1998) have shown that a SYS-GMM 
estimator, which uses the variables both in differences and levels produces consistent 
estimates in the face of heterogeneity, endogenous variables, and country specific effects (see 
also Arrelano and Bond (1991)). Instrumentation for the differenced equation follows the 
same rules as those already discussed in the context of the DIF-GMM estimator, i.e. suitably 
lagged levels of the endogenous variables. Additionally, for the levels equation it is required 
that each regressor, xit , , satisfies the condition that  Ex it i () , ∆ η = 0,  and that initial values 
conform to the requirement that Ey ii () , ∆ 2 0 η = . If this is the case, then the first lag of the 
differenced dependent variable and the first difference of the regressors can be used as 
instruments in the levels equation. The first of these conditions implies that the regressor in 
levels can be correlated with the country specific effects as long as the first difference is not. 
When this holds, the second condition also holds provided that sufficiently many realisations 
of the levels process have taken place. Generally, the validity of the instruments can be 
determined using the Sargan test, which assesses the orthogonality between instruments and 
the residuals, and by testing for first and second order serial correlation of the residuals, 
which indicates the extent of the correlation between country specific effects and error 
components.  
 
Data Sources and Description 
The data on private and public investment per GDP is based on data collected at the 
World Bank by Serven (1998) (which is an updated version of the data set by Serven (1996)). 
Investment data should be interpreted with some caution, and private investment data even 
more so. This is because private investment data is produced as a residual, which therefore 
                                                            
12 The loss referred to here is the information contained in the level, not the loss of the first observation to 
differencing.   15 
contains not only private investment’s own measurement errors, but errors from the 
measurement of total and public investment. Additionally, it has not been possible to take 
account of differences in depreciation rates across individual countries in the sample due to 
lack of data. There are good reasons to expect such differences to exist. For example, the 
procurement of spare parts for the maintenance of capital stocks in some countries may be 
more difficult due to various import restrictions, thus leading to a more rapid deterioration of 
capital stocks in those countries (Ndulu and O'Connell (1999)). Some countries may also be 
saddled with disproportionately many ‘white elephants’, which have proven incapable of 
surviving international competition as trade regime have become more liberal over the sample 
period. For example, in African countries where public investment constitutes a greater share 
of total investment than in other countries (see Table 3 below), the hardening of budget 
constraints during the 1980s will have meant that existing public sector capital stocks were 
particularly difficult to maintain. Finally, the unavailability of data on obsolescence rates for 
capital in different countries means that investment rates do not take account of the extent to 
which some developing countries have made swifter and more frequent leaps forward in 
terms of the sophistication of their capital equipment simply by virtue of having more 
catching up to do.  
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where nomR is the nominal interest rate and  & π  is the rate of inflation. It was not possible to 
use identical definitions of interest rates for all countries due to data limitations. Lending and 
commercial bank rates have been used wherever possible and otherwise the discount rate has 
been used. The inflation rate is calculated as the difference in logs of CPI. Both interest rates 
and CPI are from IFS.  
The share of private sector credit in GDP was calculated from IFS using Claims on the 
Private Sector and Nominal GDP. The relative price of capital variable was constructed as the 
investment deflator divided by the GDP deflator. The investment deflator was constructed as 
the ratio of nominal GDI from the World Bank in local current prices divided by real GDI, 
likewise from the World Bank, but in local 1987 prices. The GDP deflator was obtained from 
the World Bank in 1987 constant local prices. Growth rates are calculated as the annual 
difference in logs of World Bank real GDP in 1987 US$.  
The size of the final estimation sample is restricted from three directions. First, the 
availability of data on investment as well as its determinants is quite limited across time as 
well as across countries. Secondly, GMM estimation requires a minimum of 5 consecutive 
observations per country to produce a reasonable number of internal instruments. This means 
that countries are dropped if they have fewer than 5 observations, or if the observations are 
not consecutive. Only 56 of the 113 countries for which shock and uncertainty variables are 
available satisfy the investment data availability and five 5 observations criteria. Thirdly, in 
order to evaluate the impact of shocks the sample should obviously contain at least 1 shock 
for each country within the sample period. A further 12 countries fail on the criterion for the   16 
presence of a shock within that feasible sample period.
13 The final sample therefore consists 
of 44 countries covering 54 positive shock episodes and 36 negative shock episodes. The 
panel is unbalanced with 20 African and 24 non-African developing countries. The longest 
continuous sample period is 22 years (1971-1992), which is available for 18 countries. The 
country with the shortest consecutive sample period is Panama with 7 observations.  
Table 2 shows how positive and negative shocks are distributed across the sample. 
The average number of positive shocks per country is close to the sample average of 1.23 for  
Sub-Saharan African, South Asian and East Asian countries as well as mixed producers, and 
agricultural non-food producers.
14 The remaining classifications either have a slightly lower 
average number of shocks (Latin American countries and non-agricultural non-oil producers), 
or a somewhat higher average number of shocks (Caribbean producers and South Africa as 
well as oil producers). Latin American countries have on average more negative shocks than 
other countries, while South and East Asia have fewer. South Africa’s major negative shocks 
did not feature within the 21 year sample period for which data was available. No Pacific 
countries qualify. 
Table 3 shows basic descriptive statistics on the key variables. The average real 
private fixed investment rate in the sample of African countries is 7.94% compared to 12.06% 
in Middle Eastern and North African countries, and 11.60% in other developing countries. 
Meanwhile, public investment commands a larger share of GDP in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(8.31%) than in other developing countries (6.91%), excluding Middle Eastern and North 
African countries (14.1%).
15 The combination of relatively low private investment and 
relatively high public investment means that the ratio of public sector investment to private 
sector investment in Sub-Saharan Africa is substantially larger than in most non-oil producing 
countries, reflecting what others have found (Adam and O'Connell (1998)). It is also clear 
from Table 2 that investment exhibits considerably more variability across African countries 
than in other regions with standard deviations which are in all cases greater than for other 
regional groups. A few other points are worth noting. While there is not much discernible 
difference in average growth rates across regions, the variability of growth in Sub-Saharan 
Africa is greater. The same applies to the real price of capital goods. Additionally, real 
domestic interest rates and credit available to the private sector are lower in Sub-Saharan 
Africa than in other non-oil producing developing countries.  
The lower panel of Table 3 shows full sample and regional sub-sample averages of the 
full range of uncertainty measures used in the analysis. Uncertainty is greater when shocks are 
not controlled for, suggesting that outliers or shocks may account for much of the uncertainty; 
the differences in the severity of uncertainty across regions is also reduced considerably when 
controlling for shocks, notably for the oil producing Middle Eastern and North African 
countries, which generally experience the greatest uncertainty. Finally, while the level of 
commodity prices is higher on average in Sub-Saharan Africa than in the other regions in the 
sample period (Index 1990=1), the standard deviation is also greater, which probably reflects 
the greater decline of the prices of commodities produced by African countries over the 
sample period.    
                                                            
13 Note that the 12 countries omitted for lack of shocks did experience shocks, but not within the sample period 
during which data on the other variables were available. 
14 A country is a classified as a producer of a particular type of commodity if 50% or more of its commodity 
exports of that type. For more details on how commodities are classified, see Dehn (forthcoming-b).  
15 It is useful to consider this last group separately due to the importance of oil to these countries.   17 
 
7. Results 
This section reports SYS-GMM estimates as well as OLS and FE(WG) estimates.  All 
three estimators are used to provide an indication of the robustness of the results to different 
estimation methods. The pooled OLS estimator is clearly more efficient, but likely to generate 
highly biased coefficients by virtue of ignoring both country specific effects and possible 
endogeneity of the right hand side variables.
16 The FE(WG) estimator addresses the first of 
these criticisms. In modelling country specific effects, the fixed effects specification was only 
accepted if fixed effects were not rejected in favour of random effects according to Hausman 
and Breusch-Pagan tests. The Hausman test asks if there are significant differences in the 
slope coefficients between a GLS (Random Effects) and the FE(WG) estimator, while the 
null hypothesis of the Breusch-Pagan test is that the variance of the country specific effects is 
zero.  
As argued, it is not realistic to assume that all the right hand side variables are 
exogenous. The SYS-GMM model therefore instruments for the lagged dependent variable, 
the growth terms, credit to the private sector, the price of capital goods, and domestic interest 
rates. In instrumenting for these variables, the efficiency of the estimates is invariably 
reduced. There is therefore a trade off: Relinquishing the potentially biased FE(WG) or OLS 
estimators in favour of the unbiased SYS-GMM estimator also means adopting a less 
efficient estimator, but when the bias is small, the FE(WG) may in principle be the preferred 
estimator on a mean squared error criterion. 
Table 4 reports the estimates for the canonical private investment model. The model 
specification satisfies the basic requirements of a baseline model. The expected signs and 
coefficient magnitudes are broadly in line with expectation, notably for the FE(WG) and 
SYS-GMM models. The effect of public investment on private investment is statistically 
indistinguishable from zero, indicating that aggregate public investment neither substitutes for 
nor complements private investment. There is evidence in the OLS and FE(WG) models that 
accelerator effects work strongly in developing countries, a result also found by Oshikoya 
(1994). The signs on the coefficients are in most cases similar across different estimators, and 
coefficient estimates tend to be of the same order of magnitude as well. Interest rates are not 
significant in the canonical model, but enter the regressions with the correct sign. The price of 
capital goods and capital account restrictions are significant with the correct sign. Finally, 
private credit is important in the OLS model, but not significant in the FE(WG) and SYS-
GMM models.   
The coefficient on the lagged dependent variable using the SYS-GMM estimator falls 
within the upper and lower range limits defined by the pooled OLS and FE(WG) estimates, 
but is closer to the latter, which indicates that country specific effects matter considerably in 
this regression. Meanwhile, time effects do not have much effect as substantiated by the F and 
Wald tests for pooling across the time dimension which cannot be rejected within 
conventional confidence levels. It is also noteworthy that the SYS-GMM model supports a 
constant returns to scale production function by virtue of the unity long run relationship 
between growth and investment ( [0.25+0.12]/[1-63]=1).    
Both Hausman and Breusch-Pagan tests indicate that fixed country specific effects can 
not be rejected in favour of random effects. Hence, this and subsequent tables report only the 
FE(WG) results. Attention is drawn to the insignificance of the growth variables in the SYS-
                                                            
16 Each model includes time dummies.   18 
GMM model, which is a general result, which is most likely due to poor instrumentation. Past 
levels and differences are poor correlates of current values of the growth variables, so it is not 
surprising that the Sargan tests consistently indicate that instrumentation in this and the 
following equations presented below is not optimal. There is also some evidence of second 
order serial correlation. This could be indicative of correlation between the errors and some 
unknown omitted explanatory variable. The error term is bound to contain elements of 
unobserved country specific effects by virtue of the fact that the levels equation in a SYS-
GMM model is estimated as a pooled model. 
Table 5 reports the preferred shock augmented model based on the full sample of 819 
observations and 44 countries. The shock and commodity price variables enter the regressions 
with a one period lag after it was found that current values were not significant. This lag can 
be explained quite easily. Most obviously, it may take time to plan investment projects. 
Moreover, payments to producers are often delayed substantially from the time the product is 
sold in the main markets in USA and Europe. Meanwhile, domestic financial markets operate 
poorly, so that agents are often unable to borrow for investment purposes against expectations 
of future income. Another potential explanation is that if capacity utilisation is below 
optimum for a large number of firms, the initial response to increased demand among the 
bulk of firms is to use up spare capacity first, and then only subsequently to engage in 
expansion of the capital stock (buffer effect for aggregate investment).  
In the preferred model, the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable again falls 
within the required range defined by the OLS and FE(WG) estimates, and the long run 
coefficient indicates constant returns to scale. The positive shock dummy indicates that 
investment rates on average increase during shocks compared to non-shock periods. The full 
effect of shocks is, however, conditional upon the level of commodity prices at which the 
shock occurs. The negative interaction term between the shock dummy and the level of prices 
means that for a given shock magnitude the higher the level of commodity prices at the time 
of the shock the lower the investment rate. This is an interesting result, which lends support to 
a theoretical prediction (which has also found empirical validity in the context of the Kenyan 
coffee boom) that large shocks depress the marginal efficiency of investment (Collier and 
Pattillo (2000), Bevan, Collier and Gunning (1990a)). As these authors have argued, the 
depression of the marginal efficiency of investment can come about through a combination of 
rising domestic costs and the exhaustion of profitable domestic investment opportunities 
during a positive windfall. Such effects are clearly likely to be more prevalent when shocks 
occur at a time when commodity prices are already high, because capacity is then nearer to 
full utilisation compared to periods when export revenues are low and demand consequently 
depressed.  
Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between a shock and investment rates, conditional 
upon the level of prices. The figure is based on the coefficients from the SYS-GMM model. 
The figure shows the percentage change in (log) investment rate on the vertical axis and the 
level of (log) commodity prices on the horizontal axis. The downwards sloping schedules are 
drawn for a shock of a given size, and describe the relationship between the change in 
investment rates and shocks, conditional upon the price level. The bold line depicts this 
relationship for a shock at the 2.5% cut off. The range on the X-axis is defined over the 
maximum and minimum values of commodity prices in the sample. The mean is 0.17 and the 
standard deviation is 0.32, such that 2 standard deviation bands are located at -0.55 and 0.89, 
respectively. It is evident from Figure 1 that the downward sloping schedule is in the positive   19 
region for the majority of price realisations. This means that shocks usually increase 
investment rates relative to non-shock periods. The exception is when shocks occur at a time 
when commodity prices are already high in which case they tend to reduce investment rates 
relative to what they would have been in non-shock periods.  
How is this result to be interpreted? A priori, it is expected that the bulk of a transitory 
windfall is saved and invested, wherefore investment should increase proportionately more 
than GDP. The observed fall in investment rates during shocks which occur at times when 
prices are high is therefore surprising. Indeed, even if domestic investment opportunities are 
exhausted, this would only imply that investment rates level off at a high level commensurate 
with the minimum return available on foreign assets. One interpretation is that agents face 
restrictions on access to foreign savings instruments which are not adequately modelled using 
the rather crude capital account restrictions variable. If so, agents may opt to consume rather 
than to invest the marginal unit of windfall, boosting GDP at the expense of investment.  
An alternative explanation for falling investment rates is that governments tax 
windfalls above a certain magnitude. Collier and Gunning (1996) have argued that 
governments often fail to save windfalls, and even when they save early on they then fail to 
lock into the savings decision, proceeding to spend the windfall rapidly. Windfall spending 
typically involves a considerably element of consumption for political reasons, and 
governments often end up with widened fiscal deficits after the end of the shock (Schuknecht 
(1996))
17. The promise of future taxation to re-establish balance in government finances after 
the shock may cause private investment rates to drop. Note, however, that while investment 
rates fall, they never become negative, because the change in investment rates never exceeds 
the mean investment rate for any region. 
What is the effect on the shock-investment relationship of changing the cut off point 
for identifying shocks, given that the cut-off point was chosen arbitrarily? Figure 1 therefore 
also shows investment-price level schedules for shocks defined according to 5% and 10% cut-
offs (thin and dotted lines, respectively). The main effect of moving to a less extreme cut off 
point is to pivot the schedule to a flatter slope, thus reducing the investment effects at low 
levels of commodity prices while increasing them at higher levels relative to the 2.5% cut off. 
This is indeed what one would expect in light of the previous results which show that only 
large changes in commodity prices are significant. As the cut off point is reduced, non-shocks 
are included in the sample of shock episodes which tends to erode the negative effects of 
shocks at large price levels and increasing the positive effects at low price levels equally so.  
Two further aspects of Table 5 are worthy of attention. The first is that uncertainty 
does not feature in the preferred model. One potential reason is that the measure used for 
measuring uncertainty is unsuitable. It is obviously impossible to test all conceivable 
uncertainty measures, since this is an infinite set. However, a total of 9 different uncertainty 
measures were attempted and none of them were robustly statistically significant.
18 Hence, 
while it may be possible to develop alternative measures of commodity price uncertainty 
                                                            
17 Deaton and Miller (1995) point out that it is difficult to distinguish clearly between investment and 
consumption expenditures in public spending. 
18 The only exception was the standard Ramey and Ramey time invariant uncertainty measure, which returned a 
positive significant coefficient (at 10%) when applied to the full sample in the pooled OLS model (but not in the 
SYS-GMM model). The sign changed and the coefficient became completely insignificant, however, when oil 
countries were dropped, which suggests that the Ramey and Ramey time invarying uncertainty measure may be 
driven by large positive oil shocks. Moreover, it is unclear how a time invarying uncertainty measure should be 
interpreted vis-à-vis unobserved country specific effects.    20 
which are significant in this model, it is likely that significance will be highly dependent on 
the precise specification of uncertainty used, and hence unlikely to be very robust.  
Another potential explanation for the insignificance of uncertainty is that agents are 
somehow able to hedge against the risk imparted by future commodity price uncertainty. This 
explanation only seems credible to the extent that countries and agents have access to market 
based risk management tools. These instruments require considerable financial resources to 
which, it seems reasonable to assume, only multinational corporations have access. In 
particular, small scale agricultural producers as well as many developing country 
governments do not generally have access to the financing required to utilise such tools 
(International Task Force on Commodity Risk Management in Developing Countries (1999)). 
In order to determine if the insignificance of the uncertainty variable is driven by those 
countries in the sample whose exports are extracted and traded by creditworthy 
multinationals, two further sets of regressions were run. The first excludes non-agricultural 
non-oil countries (effectively excluding countries heavily dependent on mining), and the 
second excludes oil producers as well as non-agricultural non-oil producing countries. For 
each of these sub-samples, we use the GARCH based uncertainty measure which ‘dummies’ 
out the effects of the first oil shock, since this measure performs best among the available 
alternatives. Table 6 shows the four relevant regressions. Regression 1 is the canonical model 
augmented only with (the best performing) uncertainty variable estimated over the full 
sample. Regression 2 adds the shock terms and is also estimated over the full sample. 
Regressions 3 and 4 are similar to Regression 2, but are estimated over the samples which 
exclude oil producers, and oil and mining exporters, respectively. In each case, it is clear that 
uncertainty is not a significant determinant of private investment. We take this to imply that 
hedging is unlikely to be the reason for the insignificance of commodity price uncertainty, 
since uncertainty remains insignificant even when we consider only those countries which 
presumably do not have access to market based hedging. 
The result that commodity price uncertainty does not impact on private investment is 
compatible with the findings from growth regressions (Dehn (forthcoming-a)). Hence, while 
intriguing, the result is neither inconsistent with theoretical priors nor with other results in the 
literature. The effects of risk aversion and convex profit functions may, for example, simply 
be cancelling each other out, or commodity price uncertainty per se may not be the most 
important source of uncertainty in the eyes of investors. Serven (1998) finds that (a) terms of 
trade uncertainty has no significant impact on private investment, and (b) real exchange rate 
uncertainty is the dominant source of uncertainty. 
The second noteworthy feature of the preferred specification in Table 5 is that 
negative shocks do not appear to matter to private investment. In other words, positive and 
negative shocks have highly asymmetric effects on investment. To examine the robustness of 
this finding further, a number of additional regressions were run (shown in Table 7). In the 
simplest case, the commodity price and shock variables in the preferred model were replaced 
by the change in commodity prices variable, which does distinguish neither between positive 
and negative shocks nor between large and small changes in prices (Regression 1). This 
variable was never significant, even when the change was conditioned upon the level of 
commodity prices. When the square of the change in commodity prices was added 
(conditioning on levels, Regression 2) the same result obtained. Similarly, the level of 
commodity prices and its square was also tried on the hypothesis that a simple quadratic 
relationship may provide a better explanation than the shock dummy (Regression 3). This   21 
specification, which also imposes symmetry between positive and negative shocks, was 
firmly rejected by the data. Large shocks therefore have special significance, possibly because 
small price changes are not sufficient to raise the rate of return above the required hurdle rate. 
In this view, smaller changes in prices may engender an expansion in capacity utilisation 
among firms operating within their production possibility frontiers, but not by enough to 
produce a statistically significant aggregate private investment response. These results   
underscore the general conclusion that it is big positive shocks conditioned upon the level of 
commodity prices that matter.  
Finally, encompassing tests were carried out for competing specifications of shocks 
(Regression 4).
19 The strategy is to ask whether the preferred positive shock measures reject 
the symmetric measures, and whether the symmetric measures reject the positive shock terms. 
It is possible that both may reject (implying that there is information in both measures but to 
different extents), that neither will reject (implying that the data cannot discriminate between 
the two), or that one specification will reject the other (giving a clear-cut decision). The last 
result was obtained according to which commodity prices in levels, the positive shock dummy 
and the positive interaction term jointly reject the symmetric response (composed of the level 
of commodity prices, the change in commodity prices, and the interaction term between the 
two), thus confirming that the asymmetrical approach to modelling shocks is superior.  
The robustness of the results to changes in the sample was also explored. Priors 
suggest three alternative sample definitions. First, commodity shocks are likely to matter 
more to less diversified economies and to economies with greater restrictions on access to 
international capital markets. We may therefore expect to find that shocks matter particularly 
to low income countries and less or not at all to middle income countries. Secondly, African 
countries are among the most heavily commodity dependent economies in the world 
wherefore shocks may matter more here than in other regions. Thirdly, the oil shocks in the 
1970s are always dominant in discussions of trade shocks and it is therefore natural to control 
for oil shocks when trying to determine the general validity of shocks as determinants of 
private investment. Table 8 shows the results of estimating the preferred model on alternative 
sample specifications using the SYS-GMM estimator. A number of features are worth 
drawing attention to:  
First, regression 1 shows that commodity price movements and shocks do not appear 
to matter to Middle Income countries (defined as countries with income per capita in excess 
of US$1900 in both 1970 and 1990). Secondly, while investment rates in non-Sub-Saharan 
African countries are sensitive to commodity price movements, there is no evidence to 
suggest that these countries are particularly affected by shocks (regression 4). Thirdly, oil is 
not driving the shocks result, which can be verified from regression 3, which shows that the 
shock variables remain significant after dropping oil countries (defined as countries for which 
oil constitutes more than 50% of total commodity exports). Finally, Sub-Saharan Africa is 
significantly affected by shocks as are low income countries more generally of which the 
majority are, of course, Sub-Saharan African countries (regressions 2 and 5).  
These partial sample results are less stable than the full sample results, partly because 
of smaller sample size. This may account for a number of peculiar differences which emerged 
when different estimators were used. For example, when the FE(WG) estimator is applied to 
non-SSA countries sample, the shock variables become significant, although this result is not 
                                                            
19 For convenience, the test results are based on the FE(WG) results. The similarity of coefficient magnitudes 
and significance suggests a similar result based on the SYS-GMM estimator.   22 
forthcoming with the OLS or SYS-GMM estimators (not shown). Similarly, whereas the 
lagged growth term is positive in the FE(WG) and OLS models, the coefficient on this 
variable is negative in the SSA sample when using the SYS-GMM estimator. Perhaps this 
indicates income gains are more quickly reversed in SSA, a result which is compatible with 
the findings in Dehn (forthcoming-a). 
Pesaran and Smith (1995) have showed that pooling of dynamic panels may result in 
inconsistent results if parameters are not constant. In order to test for poolability, we 
conducted Chow tests. Critical values can either be obtained from a normal F table, which 
assumes that the test is centred on zero, or from a non-centred MSE table on the argument 
that it is preferable to balance the negative bias effects of illegitimate pooling against the 
positive efficiency benefits of a larger sample when deciding if pooling is justified. Critical 
values have been developed for the MSE criterion by Goodnight and Wallace (1972) and 
Wallace and Toro-Vizcarrondo (1969). Unfortunately, pooling is rejected on both the strict F 
criterion and on the MSE criterion for the preferred model, but poolability cannot be rejected 
at the 5% level on the MSE criterion if uncertainty terms and negative shocks are added back 
into the model. Their inclusion does not change the coefficients from the preferred regression 
however, which we take as an indication that negative shocks and uncertainty may matter not 
in terms of their effects on coefficient size but rather in terms of their effects on the 
coefficient’s standard error.  
It should be noted, however, that Chow tests are invalid in the presence of groupwise 
heteroskedasticity. Our results only correct for simple heteroskedasticity, not for groupwise 
heteroskedasticity. While it is possible in some circumstances to correct for groupwise 
heteroskedasticity, our attempts were unsuccessful because it was not possible to identify the 
unknown sources of heteroskedasticity. We also failed to successfully implement the 
approach recommended by Pesaran and Smith (1995) and used by Serven (1998), which 
involves estimation of coefficients of the preferred regressions specification for each 
individual country and then generating a weighted average of the coefficients and standard 
errors (where the weights are the number of observations for each country). The reason for 
failure is undoubtedly the shortness of the time series available for each country. Unlike 
Serven who applies the methodology to a model with 9 parameters our model has 16 
parameters and a maximum sample size of just 22 observations per country. The implication 
is that it cannot with confidence be ruled out that the results suffer from the inconsistency 





Deaton and Miller (1995) find that commodity prices have strong effects on 
investment using an extended VAR framework, although they also make the point that a clear 
distinction between consumption and investment in their model cannot be justified due to the 
quality of the data. Our results are compatible with their findings and subject to their caveat.  
Where our results depart from Deaton and Miller (1995) is that we are able to be more 
specific about the particular manifestations of commodity price movements which matter to 
investors. By comparing various different specifications of commodity price movements, 
including levels, first differences, large and small price changes, and positive and negative 
price changes, we have been able to establish two main conclusions:    23 
First, commodity price uncertainty does not appear to matter to investment rates in 
developing countries. We interpret this to mean that commodity price uncertainty is not the 
main concern of investors, perhaps because this particular source of uncertainty is perceived 
as less damaging than other sources of uncertainty. This finding is compatible with the 
findings of Serven (1998). 
Secondly, isolated extreme manifestations of commodity price changes, or shocks, 
matter to investment rates, especially in low income countries. In particular, we have 
demonstrated a fundamental asymmetry in the effects of small and large price changes and 
positive and negative large price changes. Positive shocks have a strong positive effect on 
investment rates conditional upon the level of commodity prices. When shocks occur at times 
when prices are already high, there are mechanisms - possibly to do with capital constraints or 
government intervention - which ensure that investment rates decline.  
Negative shocks on the other hand appear not to affect investment rates. This is 
curious given that Dehn (forthcoming-a) finds that growth responds strongly to negative 
shocks. Growth can, of course, change dramatically without changes in investment. Easterly 
et al. (1993), for example, point out that growth rates are far less persistent than investment 
rates, so all growth variation cannot possibly be accounted for by variation in investment. But 
if countries do not adjust to negative shocks by disinvesting, how do they adjust? One 
possibility is that they do adjust, but that the absence of an investment rate response is simply 
an artefact of the way investment data is collected in National Accounts. Investment data are 
often constructed on the assumption that the import content of investment projects stays 
constant during the shock. However, the powerful relative price changes which accompany 
temporary trade shocks may undermine the validity of this assumption. The import content of 
investment projects is likely to rise during shocks if short run supply constraints cause the 
price of non-tradable capital goods to rise. Similarly, during negative shocks non-tradable 
capital prices fall relative to imported capital goods prices. To the extent that agents respond 
to relative price changes by switching between imported and domestic capital goods, the 
assumption of a fixed import ratio in investment projects results in an overestimate of 
investment during positive shocks and an underestimate of disinvestment during negative 
shocks
20. Unfortunately, we have no alternative sources of investment data which enable us to 
control for this effect, it is only possible to note that a bias from this source may contribute to 
the observed absence of an investment response to negative shocks.   
An alternative explanation for the absence of a negative investment response is that 
economies adjust by lowering capacity utilisation rather than disinvesting
21. A sharp and 
lasting reduction in capacity utilisation will be reflected in GDP and hence in growth rates. 
The capacity utilisation argument rests on the notion that investment decisions are largely 
                                                            
20 For example, suppose that an investment project is assumed to required in fixed proportion one imported input 
and one domestically produced unit. If positive shocks shift relative prices in favour of imports, and agents 
respond buy importing a bigger proportion of their total investment expenditures, then the domestic investment 
response will be over-estimated, because it is determined with reference to the amount of imports which is now 
larger. Similarly, during a negative shock if agents switch to more domestic capital intensive methods, which are 
now cheaper relative to imported capital, then capital imports will underestimate the disinvestment during 
negative shocks, because the 1:1 ratio between imported and domestic capital is no longer maintained. 
21 Negative shocks could conceivably cause the rate of technical progress to slow down, for example by reducing 
the willingness of investors to adopt new and better technologies, but one would expect such innovations to be 
embedded in new equipment and hence at least partly reflected in lower investment. This we do not find, 
however.   24 
irreversible, because if investments were reversible firms would simply get rid of excess 
capital during negative shocks, and the investment response to positive and negative shocks 
would be entirely symmetrical. Not only is a greater share of the exports of developing 
countries are subject to commodity price uncertainty, but these countries also have thinner 
second hard markets for investment goods, and very limited mechanisms for outright sale of 
going concerns (Collier and Gunning (1999b)). The case for regarding investment in 
developing countries as irreversible is therefore quite strong. 
The remaining consideration pertains to depreciation and/or obsolescence rates for 
capital stocks. High depreciation and obsolescence rates shorten the duration of irreversibility 
constraints, so the suitability of the irreversibility argument hinges in part on the assumption 
that depreciation rates and obsolescence rates are fairly low in those sectors affected by 
negative shocks. A priori, depreciation rates are likely to be lower for structures and buildings 
than for investments in machines and equipment with moving parts. Obsolescence rates are 
driven by the rate of technical progress, wherefore they are lower in sectors which use less 
dynamic technologies. Commodity sectors are mainly agriculture and mining. Agriculture is 
generally regarded as a sector which has seen little technical progress in all but a few of the 
poorest developing countries (Ghatak (1987))
22, and the record of technical innovation in 
agriculture in Africa has been particularly bad (Timmer (1988)). It is also largely a non-
equipment intensive activity which uses labour intensive production technologies. For these 
reasons, we would expect depreciation and obsolescence rates to be low in agriculture, 
particularly in Africa. Meanwhile, in the mining sector the resale potential for capital is likely 
to be low once installed, although depreciation rates for mining equipment will probably be 
greater than for agricultural equipment due to the equipment intensity in mining. On the other 
hand, the sector is not particularly dynamic in terms of technical progress. On balance, one 
would therefore expect irreversibility constraints to bind the hardest in agriculture, followed 
by mining sector followed by manufacturing. This provides broad support for the argument 
that adjustment to negative shocks in commodity sectors is not so much by ceasing to 
undertake replacement investment as by reducing capacity utilisation. 
 
                                                            
22 The exception is the adoption of Green Revolution technologies in Asia, but that experience has not be 
replicated in other regions of the world.    25 
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Table 1: Uncertainty and variability measures 






I Time  varying 
uncertainty 
GARCH conditional variance of one step 
ahead forecast error 
LDV, T, T^2, QD   
II Time  varying 
uncertainty 
Garch conditional variance of one step 
ahead forecast error dummying out first oil 
shock 
LDV, T, T^2, QD  1973Q3-1974Q2 
III Time  varying 
uncertainty 
Garch conditional variance of one step 
ahead forecast error dymmying out all 
shocks 
LDV, T, T^2, QD  2.5% positive and 
negative shocks 
IV Time  varying 
uncertainty 
Garch conditional standard deviation of one 
step ahead forecast error 
LDV, T, T^2, QD   
V Time  varying 
uncertainty 
Garch conditional standard deviation of one 
step ahead forecast error dymmying out first 
oil shock 
LDV, T, T^2, QD  1973Q3-1974Q2 
VI Time  varying 
uncertainty 
Garch conditional standard deviation of one 
step ahead forecast error dummying out all 
shocks 
LDV, T, T^2, QD  2.5% positive and 
negative shocks 
VII Time  invariant 
uncertainty 
Ramey & Ramey unconditional standard 
deviation 
LDV, T, T^2, QD   
VIII Time  invariant 
uncertainty 
Ramey & Ramey unconditional standard 
deviation 
LDV, T,  QD  Trend break and 
intercept break in 
1973Q3 
IX Time  invariant 
variability 
Simple unconditional standard deviation      
(Note: 'LDV' , ‘T’, ‘T^2’, and ‘QD’ denote lagged dependent variable, linear time trend, trend squared, and quarterly dummies) 
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Table 2: Distribution of shocks across sample 












Full sample  819 44  54  36  1.23  0.82 
Sub-Saharan Africa  333 17  25  11  1.47  0.65 
Middle East and North 
Africa 
48 3  3  3  1.00  1.00 
Latin America  213 13  10  17  0.77  1.31 
South Asia  86 4  5  2  1.25  0.50 
East Asia  97 5  7  2  1.40  0.40 
Pacific  na        
Caribbean  21 1  2  1  2.00  1.00 
South Africa  21 1  2  0  2.00  0.00 
Agricultural foodstuff 
producers 
337 19  20  15  1.05  0.79 
Agricultural non-food 
producers 
82 5  6  4  1.20  0.80 
Non-agricultural non-oil 
producers 
119 6  5  4  0.83  0.67 
Oil producers  237 12  20  11  1.67  0.92 
Mixed producers  44 2  3  2  1.50  1.00 
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obs 819 333 48 438
n  44 17 3 24
Private investment to GDP 9.97 7.94 12.06 11.60
(1.95) (2.42) (1.43) (1.50)
Public investment to GDP 7.77 8.31 14.10 6.91
(1.81) (1.93) (1.48) (1.66)
Growth 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03
(0.06) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05)
Domestic interest rates 2.36 2.16 2.02 2.56
(1.28) (1.19) (1.22) (1.30)
Real price of capital goods 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(1.35) (1.40) (1.20) (1.33)
Share of private sector credit 0.22 0.16 0.20 0.29
(2.06) (1.96) (2.19) (1.88)
I 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
II 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
III 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
IV 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.08
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
V 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08
(0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04)
VI 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
VII 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.07
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
VIII 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.07
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
IX 0.31 0.31 0.38 0.30
(0.13) (0.13) (0.11) (0.12)
Log of real commodity prices (lagged one 
period)
0.17 0.22 0.12 0.14
(0.37) (0.42) (0.30) (0.34)  
(Note: Means in bold and standard deviations in italics. Key:I-Average conditional variance; II-Average conditional variance controlling 
for 1973/74 shock; III-Average conditional variance controlling for all shocks; IV-Average conditional standard deviation; V-Average 
conditional standard deviation controlling for 1973/74 shock; VI-Average standard deviation controlling for all shocks; VII-Ramey and 
Ramey unconditional standard deviation; VIII-Ramey and Ramey measure with breaks; IX-simple unconditional standard deviation )   33 
Table 4:  
Private investment regression results: Canonical model
Dependent variable: Log of private investment to GDP
(White heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors in (italics))
All regressions include time dummies








Constant 0.02 -0.81 *** -0.44
(0.19) (0.28) (0.56)
Log private investment to GDP_1 (lnpvy) 0.87 *** 0.63 *** 0.63 ***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.07)
Log Public investment to GDP (lnpby) -0.02 0.01 0.00
(0.02) (0.03) (0.07)
Growth (y) 0.45 ** 0.42 *** 0.25
(0.20) (0.15) (0.38)
Growth_1 (y_1) 0.33 * 0.39 *** 0.12
(0.19) (0.15) (0.24)
Log of real domestic interest rates (lndomr) -0.08 -0.04 -0.14
(0.05) (0.10) (0.16)
Log of real price of capital goods (lnrpc) -0.09 ** -0.36 *** -0.34 ***
(0.04) (0.06) (0.11)
Log of real private credit to the private sector (lncred) 0.04 ** 0.01 0.05
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Capital account restrictions (kar) 0.00 -0.02 -0.17 **
(0.02) (0.05) (0.08)
No. countries 44 44 44
No. observations 819 819 819
F(regression) 132.86 *** 31.07 ***
Pooling F(GMM: Wald) test across time periods 0.14 28.99
Pooling F test across countries 3.46 ***
Parameter constancy Chow F test
Parameter constancy Chow MSE test
R squared 0.85 0.82
Hausman (H0: Dif. in coef. random) 142.64 ***
Breusch-Pagan (H0: Var(u)=0) 0.18
S.C. 1 test (H0: No 1st order serial correlation) -3.25 ***
S.C. 2 test (H0: No 2nd order serial correlation) 0.32
Sargan test pvalue (H0: Optimal instruments) -1.00 ***
Wald test (all regressors) 232.50 ***
Instrumented variables: lnpvy_1 lnpby y
y_1 lndomr lnrpc
lncred
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Table 5:  
Private investment regression results: Preferred specification
Dependent variable: Log of private investment to GDP
(White heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors in (italics))
All regressions include time dummies








Constant 0.03 -0.77 *** -0.35
(0.19) (0.28) (0.57)
Log private investment to GDP_1 (lnpvy) 0.87 *** 0.63 *** 0.65 ***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.07)
Log Public investment to GDP (lnpby) -0.02 0.00 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.08)
Growth (y) 0.42 ** 0.39 ** 0.31
(0.19) (0.15) (0.41)
Growth_1 (y_1) 0.30 0.37 ** 0.05
(0.18) (0.15) (0.24)
Log of real domestic interest rates (lndomr) -0.09 * -0.05 -0.09
(0.05) (0.10) (0.15)
Log of real price of capital goods (lnrpc) -0.09 ** -0.35 *** -0.31 ***
(0.04) (0.06) (0.10)
Log of real private credit to the private sector (lncred) 0.03 ** 0.01 0.04
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
Capital account restrictions (kar) 0.00 -0.01 -0.18 **
(0.02) (0.05) (0.08)
Log of Commodity prices, lagged 1 period -0.01 0.01 -0.02
(0.03) (0.04) (0.06)
Positive shocks, lagged 1 period 0.31 ** 0.27 *** 0.42 **
(0.15) (0.06) (0.20)
Positive  shock and price interacted, lagged 1 period -0.56 -0.52 *** -0.79 *
(0.39) (0.10) (0.42)
No. countries 44 44 44
No. observations 819 819 819
F(regression) 116.84 29.83 ***
Pooling F(GMM: Wald) test across time periods 0.14 24.24
Pooling F test across countries 3.29 ***
Parameter constancy Chow F test 2.03
Parameter constancy Chow MSE test 2.03 **
R squared 0.86 0.82
Hausman (H0: Dif. in coef. random) 138.60 ***
Breusch-Pagan (H0: Var(u)=0) 0.53
S.C. 1 test (H0: No 1st order serial correlation) -3.73 ***
S.C. 2 test (H0: No 2nd order serial correlation) 0.13
Sargan test pvalue (H0: Optimal instruments) -1.00 ***
Wald test (all regressors) 402.05 ***
Instrumented variables: lnpvy_1 lnpby y
y_1 lndomr lnrpc
lncred








(Note: MSE pooling test based on regression including neg_1 negldm_1 and gar)    35 
 
Table 6: 
Private investment regression results: Uncertainty
Dependent variable: Log of private investment to GDP
(White heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors in (italics))
All regressions include time dummies
Estimator: SYS-GMM











oil and oil 
producers
Constant -0.37 -0.33 -0.73 -0.64
(0.55) (0.56) (0.77) (0.99)
Log private investment to GDP_1 (lnpvy) 0.65 *** 0.65 *** 0.69 *** 0.64 ***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.11)
Log Public investment to GDP (lnpby) 0.03 0.01 0.02 -0.05
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.11)
Growth (y) 0.32 0.28 0.19 0.28
(0.43) (0.41) (0.42) (0.52)
Growth_1 (y_1) 0.08 0.05 0.10 0.03
(0.24) (0.24) (0.28) (0.39)
Log of real domestic interest rates (lndomr) -0.13 -0.12 0.10 0.10
(0.14) (0.14) (0.17) (0.25)
Log of real price of capital goods (lnrpc) -0.31 *** -0.31 *** -0.34 ** -0.34 **
(0.10) (0.11) (0.14) (0.18)
Log of real private credit to the private sector (lncred) 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.08
(0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.08)
Capital account restrictions (kar) -0.17 ** -0.18 ** -0.09 -0.03
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.13)
Uncertainty (gar70) -0.12 0.27 -0.88 -0.64
(0.81) (0.91) (0.61) (3.00)
Log of Commodity Prices, lagged 1 period -0.02 0.02 0.04
(0.06) (0.05) (0.08)
Positive shocks, lagged 1 period 0.41 ** 0.49 ** 0.44 **
(0.20) (0.20) (0.23)
Positive shocks and price interacted, lagged 1 period -0.77 * -0.94 ** -0.86 **
(0.43) (0.40) (0.45)
No. countries 44 44 38 26
No. observations 8 1 98 1 97 0 04 6 3
S.C. 1 test (H0: No 1st order serial correlation) -3.31 ** -3.75 *** -3.22 *** -2.94 ***
S.C. 2 test (H0: No 2nd order serial correlation) 0.26 0.16 -0.38 -0.01
Sargan test pvalue (H0: Optimal instruments) 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 ***
Wald test for time effects 28.28 22.23 45.53 *** 255.17 ***
Wald test (all regressors) 251.34 *** 392.34 *** 474.90 *** 140.38 ***    36 
 
Table 7: 
Private investment regression results: Competing shock specifications
Dependent variable: Log of private investment to GDP
(White heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors in (italics))
All regressions include time dummies
Estimator: SYS-GMM
















Constant -0.41 -0.33 -0.29 -0.31
(0.56) (0.55) (0.55) (0.55)
Log private investment to GDP_1 (lnpvy) 0.65 *** 0.66 *** 0.64 *** 0.65 ***
(0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08)
Log Public investment to GDP (lnpby) 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.00
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
Growth (y) 0.38 0.32 0.35 0.47
(0.45) (0.42) (0.43) (0.42)
Growth_1 (y_1) 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.08
(0.24) (0.25) (0.23) (0.24)
Log of real domestic interest rates (lndomr) -0.10 -0.12 -0.12 -0.08
(0.15) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14)
Log of real price of capital goods (lnrpc) -0.31 *** -0.31 *** -0.31 *** -0.30 ***
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11)
Log of real private credit to the private sector (lncred) 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Capital account restrictions (kar) -0.18 ** -0.19 ** -0.17 ** -0.20 ***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
ldm_1 -0.09 -0.03 0.02
(0.10) (0.06) (0.06)
Dldm_1 -0.06 0.12 -0.03
(0.08) (0.10) (0.08)








No. countries 44 44 44 44
No. observations 819 819 819 819
Encompassing F test (Positive shocks measure) 8.37 ***
Encompassing F test (Changes based measure) 0.93
S.C. 1 test (H0: No 1st order serial correlation) -3.30 *** -3.62 *** -3.73 *** -3.71 ***
S.C. 2 test (H0: No 2nd order serial correlation) 0.22 0.21 0.25 0.37
Sargan test pvalue (H0: Optimal instruments) 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 ***
Wald test for time effects 28.00 22.69 28.18 *** 27.05 ***
Wald test (all regressors) 333.08 *** 472.09 *** 379.79 *** 579.40 ***    37 
 
Table 8: 
Private investment regression results: Sample robustness
Dependent variable: Log of private investment to GDP
(White heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors in (italics))
All regressions include time dummies
Estimator: SYS-GMM











Constant 0.48 -0.29 0.14 0.56 -1.71
(0.30) (0.83) (0.66) (0.30) (0.94)
Log private investment to GDP_1 (lnpvy) 0.64 *** 0.65 *** 0.58 *** 0.65 *** 0.66 ***
(0.03) (0.10) (0.10) (0.03) (0.10)
Log Public investment to GDP (lnpby) -0.01 -0.07 -0.09 0.01 -0.01
(0.05) (0.09) (0.11) (0.04) (0.11)
Growth (y) 0.58 ** 0.12 0.34 0.24 0.08
(0.27) (0.46) (0.43) (0.33) (0.42)
Growth_1 (y_1) 0.42 -0.19 0.09 0.74 *** -0.28
(0.27) (0.33) (0.30) (0.21) (0.36)
Log of real domestic interest rates (lndomr) -0.19 ** 0.05 -0.19 -0.23 *** 0.74 *
(0.09) (0.40) (0.20) (0.08) (0.42)
Log of real price of capital goods (lnrpc) -0.14 *** -0.36 ** -0.30 *** -0.11 *** -0.51 ***
(0.05) (0.15) (0.12) (0.04) (0.14)
Log of real private credit to the private sector (lncred) 0.01 0.13 * 0.10 ** 0.02 0.14
(0.05) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.09)
Capital account restrictions (kar) 0.00 -0.24 *** -0.20 ** -0.06
(0.05) (0.09) (0.09) (0.05)
Log of Commodity Prices, lagged 1 period 0.10 0.00 0.03 0.06 * 0.02
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.04) (0.09)
Positive shocks, lagged 1 period 0.09 0.50 ** 0.44 ** 0.15 0.50 **
(0.10) (0.21) (0.19) (0.12) (0.25)
Positive shocks and price interacted, lagged 1 period -0.29 -0.90 ** -0.86 ** -0.31 -0.77 *
(0.30) (0.42) (0.35) (0.31) (0.45)
No. countries 14 30 32 27 17
No. observations 259 560 582 486 333
S.C. 1 test (H0: No 1st order serial correlation) -2.36 ** -3.27 *** -3.29 *** -3.42 *** -3.02 ***
S.C. 2 test (H0: No 2nd order serial correlation) -0.24 0.12 0.49 0.17 -0.12
Sargan test pvalue (H0: Optimal instruments) 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 ***
Wald test for time effects 20.35 76.66 *** 50.03 *** 178.01 *** 45.06 ***
Wald test (all regressors) 3658.99 *** 357.98 *** 208.58 *** 720.39 *** 447.11 ***  
 